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The main argument in this paper is a call for empirical and comparative 
research to improve our understanding of which form of governance is most 
effective in reversing the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The notion of ‘AIDS 
Governance’ should not, as in much of the current literature, be a postulated 
ideal but a variable that, potentially, can help explain why some responses 
are more effective than others. Democratic governments, it is argued, can 
respond through one of two forms of AIDS Governance. An ‘idealistic’ 
response will maximise human rights, accountability and participation since 
such democratic ideals are understood to increase and ensure the 
effectiveness of the response. An ‘authoritative’ response will limit one or 
more of the democratic ideals with the argument that such limitations will 
enable the government to respond more effectively in the interest of public 
health. While AIDS is too complex a problem for any clever governance 
quick-fix, the suggested research agenda on AIDS Governance has the 
potential to generate new knowledge of which forms of AIDS Governance are 
better equipped at tackling different aspects of the response or phases of the 
epidemic. The paper represents an effort to strengthen the contribution by 





HIV/AIDS can fame or shame Africa’s powerful presidents on the global 
stage like few other current political issues. Irrespective of other deeds and 
grand visions, political legacies are increasingly determined by what actions 
were taken or mistaken in the fight against AIDS. This is somewhat ironic 
since the trajectory of the epidemic is ultimately determined by the individual 
choices and behaviours of often the most powerless and destitute of citizens. 





Academic and advocacy literature is dominated by the normatively attractive 
argument that whatever policy interventions are implemented, these should be 
framed by democratic values and structured by democratic institutions and 
processes. Responses to HIV/AIDS that respect human rights, that invite 
broad participation from civil society, that are transparent for media and civil 
society scrutiny, and that enable voters to hold politicians accountable would 
probably empower citizens and contribute to the consolidation of democracy. 
The problem with this argument, however, is that it has little to show for its 
success in halting or reversing the epidemic in Africa. This poses some 
difficult questions: Can we afford to pursue policies that are based on 
cherished ideals even if they ultimately fail in saving lives? What alternative 
forms of AIDS governance are available, and would they be more efficient?  
 
There are three broad characteristics of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in many 
African countries that suggest failures in political efforts to respond 
effectively to the epidemic. Firstly, the epidemic became generalised in the 
population. This was because early responses failed to contain the spread of 
the HI virus. Secondly, the incidence of new HIV transmissions remains high. 
This reflects the inefficiency of various prevention interventions aimed at 
promoting abstinence and faithfulness, and the use of condoms. Thirdly, the 
health of the vast majority of those with symptomatic AIDS quickly 
deteriorates to the point of death because adequate care and sustainable ARV 
treatment is available only to a minority of those who are suffering from 
AIDS.  
 
This is not to suggest that the HIV/AIDS pandemic of today could have been 
avoided completely if only the governance response had been framed 
differently; AIDS is too complex a problem for any clever governance quick-
fix. But the observations do suggest that whatever the leverage of governance 
interventions in countering HIV/AIDS in Africa, it has not been used 
optimally. How can this be explained? I would suggest four broad 
explanations that need to be considered in answering that question, although 
their relative importance will differ between countries:  
 
• Resource constraints. African governments are severely 
constrained in terms of financial, institutional and human 
resources with which to respond to the epidemic.  
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• Donor dependency. International donors subject African 
governments to aid-conditionality, some of which may 
undermine the effectiveness and legitimacy of the countries’ 
responses to HIV/AIDS.  
• Poor governance. Due to general governance problems, 
African governments do not make optimal use of the 
resources they do control.  
• Poor AIDS governance. The AIDS governance that African 
governments have pursued may have been mistaken in itself 
or problematic in how it has come to interact with the 
resource constraints, donor dependency, and general 
governance problems referred to above.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the fourth point—that the 
ineffectiveness of the responses to HIV/AIDS by African governments has 
something to do with central governance characteristics of those responses. 
My ambition is to suggest some elements of a comparative research agenda 
through which we can improve our understanding of the degree to which 
particular types of ‘AIDS governance’ impacts on the effectiveness of the 
government response to HIV/AIDS. My main argument in relation to existing 
literature on AIDS and governance is methodological: our analytical 
discussions of ‘AIDS governance’ should be less normative and more based 
on solid empirical and comparative research. Only through such research can 
we speak with authority on which governance ‘template’ is more likely to be 
effective in epidemiological terms. This last point is important. Most 
contributions in the emerging political science literature on the epidemic are 
either studies of the impact of HIV/AIDS on governance, or studies of the 
governance response to the epidemic. While the distinction is useful in many 
regards it is also misleading in that it allows for analyses of governance 
responses to be mere descriptive accounts that mistakenly inspire authors to 
formulate far-reaching normative arguments on what should be the 
governance response to HIV/AIDS. Analyses of AIDS governance should 
also include impact studies - analyses of causality. They must seek to clarify 
what impact different governance responses have on the epidemic. 
Analytically, we should think of AIDS governance as a variable and not as a 
postulated ideal. Our analyses should frame AIDS governance as an 
independent variable that potentially can explain some of the differences in 
degrees of effectiveness of government responses. On the basis of such a 
systematic and comparative research agenda we will be able to answer 
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questions such as which type of AIDS governance is more successful with 
prevention? Or which type is better at sustaining a treatment programme? Or 
which type of governance is more effective at what stage of the epidemic? 
This explanatory research agenda on AIDS governance poses a number of key 
methodological challenges. Not least among these is to define ‘governance’, 
and then to suggest what different ‘values’ our independent variable can take 
on, i.e. what different types of AIDS governance there are. I shall discuss 
these in turn in the next section.1  
 
 





A basic criterion for this research agenda is to work with a definition of 
governance that is ‘minimal’ so as to allow for as large a variation in types of 
governance responses as possible. The definition used by the most ambitious 
current comparative project on governance—the World Governance Survey—
is therefore well suited as a starting point for our discussion: ‘Governance 
refers to the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that 
regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and 
societal actors interact to make decisions.’ (Hyden, Court, and Mease 2004 p. 
16). The authors continue to define governance as follows:  
 
a quality of the political system that … serves as an independent 
variable, an explanatory factor. In this perspective, governance 
deals with the constitutive side of how a political system operates 
rather than its distributive or allocative aspects that are more 
directly a function of policy. (Ibid)  
 
This definition does not prescribe a certain type of political system but will 
allow us to compare the effectiveness of AIDS governance in both democratic 
and non-democratic states. Nor does the definition assume any particular 
substantive outcomes from the political process. Governance is about the 
                                                 
1 The other main methodological challenge for this research agenda is to define and 
operationalise ‘effectiveness’ in relation to government responses to HIV/AIDS.  
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rules of the political game. Goran Hyden and his colleagues provide further 
conceptual clarity by relating governance to a number of concepts and 
activities (see table 1 below). Governance defines the fundamental 
institutional parameters for the political process. That process will, in turn, 
generate policies that are administered through a state bureaucracy and 
implemented at a local management level. In terms of AIDS governance at 
the level of national government we can say that governance refers to the 
rules that define who takes what type of decisions in relation to the 
government’s response. For instance, whether or not to launch a national roll-
out of ARV treatment is a policy decision. How best to process and audit the 
necessary financial resources are programmatic administrative issues, and 
how to optimise the distribution of nurses over a number of community 
clinics is a project-related management problem. The governance aspect of 
such a roll-out refers to who had the right to participate in making that 
decision, the distribution of power between those stake-holders, with what 
legitimacy they participated, and what constitutional rules and principles they 
were committed to or constrained by in doing so.   
 
 
Table 1: Governance and its relations to other concepts and activities 













Source: (Hyden, Court, and Mease 2004 p. 17).  
 
 
All of the four levels of a response to AIDS can potentially contribute to our 
understanding of why some responses are more effective than others 
(together, of course, with a range of other kinds of variables). To what extent 
the explanation to variations in degrees of effectiveness can be found at the 
level of politics, policy, programme or project is an empirical question. In 
trying to establish such causal links we need to test theories that hypothesise 
not only direct links to the dependent variable but also different interaction 
effects between two or more of the four independent variables. For instance, 
rather than arguing that a particular type of AIDS governance has a direct 
impact on the degree of effectiveness, it would probably be more realistic to 
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hypothesise that a certain kind of AIDS governance makes certain types of 
policies more plausible (or even possible) — the direct effect on the 
dependent variable can thus be found at the policy level.  
 
 
Types of AIDS Governance  
 
Governments across the world have obviously applied a range of different 
types of interventions in their responses to HIV/AIDS. Much of this variation 
is found at the policy level, but, as we shall see further below, we can also 
identify variation at the level of governance. The three-fold typology that I 
propose in table 2 below is the most general formulation of variation in AIDS 
governance. This initial typology needs to be elaborated on further before it 
can be applied to empirical research—the types need to be operationalised 
into sets of concrete criteria by which we can distinguish observable 
differences in governance approaches. As ‘ideal-type’ formulations, these 
types of governance should be understood as theoretical tools that help us 
clarify patterns in a complex reality: actual cases will only approximate these 
ideal-types. It is important to remember that our interest in types of AIDS 
governance relates to their effectiveness in terms of stopping and repressing 
the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, our dependent variable. Which type is 
normatively more appealing on other grounds is beside the analytical point at 





Table 2: Ideal-types of AIDS governance 
 
 
The first distinction I suggest is between democratic and non-democratic 
types of AIDS Governance. This distinction relies on an institutional 
definition of democracy that defines a political system as democratic on the 
basis of a particular set of political institutions, processes and fundamental 
rights. This definition is similar to our definition of governance above as it 
does not prescribe a certain substantive outcome of the democratic political 
process; it is the type of definition of democracy that lies at the core of the 
comparative literature on democratisation in Africa and elsewhere (see for 
example Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Linz and Stepan 1996).  
 
This initial distinction implies a critique of the notion of ‘democratic 
governance’ that dominates both analytical and advocacy literature on 
development in general (UNDP 2002) and on HIV/AIDS (Hsu 2004). Our 
analytical framework thus allows a democratic political system to pursue 
more than one type of AIDS governance. This empirical reality is lost to our 
analysis if we define as ‘democratic’ a particular type of AIDS governance 




Governance Central characteristic 
idealistic 
 
A response that seeks to maximise 
human rights, accountability and 
participation. Such democratic ideals are 
understood to increase and ensure the 
effectiveness of the response.  
Democratic 
authoritative A response that limits one or more of the 
democratic ideals with the argument that 
such limitations will enable the 
government to respond more effectively 
in the interest of public health.   
Non-
democratic 
authoritarian A response that is likely to disregard 
most or all democratic ideals in order to 
generate as effective a response as 
possible in the interest of the State, the 
Party or the Nation.  
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The types of AIDS governance that I suggest will be contextualised further in 
the following section. A few comments are however necessary with direct 
reference to the framework. What I call idealistic AIDS governance overlaps 
completely with what most often is referred to in the literature as ‘democratic 
governance’ in response to HIV/AIDS. By calling this type of AIDS 
governance idealistic I do not mean to suggest that it is unrealistic but that it 
is based on the assumption that in order to be effective a response should 
maximise the realisation of a number of democratic and human rights ideals. 
The type that negates those ideals in principle is authoritarian AIDS 
governance. As this type originates in a non-democratic political system, 
neither the political constitution or the general laws, nor the dominant 
political culture would oppose harsh interventions against individuals. Such 
interventions would, ultimately, be motivated by the need to protect the 
authoritarian political myth embodied by the State, the Party or the Nation. 
The authoritative type of AIDS governance represents a nuance of the two 
opposing types. It is a democratic form of governance since it has been 
formulated and adopted by a democratic political system, but it is motivated 
by the argument that a response will be more effective by restricting one or 
more of the democratic and human rights ideals rather than seeking to 
maximise them. When such restrictions occur they are regarded as exceptions 
and are subject to stringent constitutional criteria and control. They gain 
legitimacy in the body politic by being adopted through a democratic process 
and through their effectiveness in countering what is perceived to be a severe 
threat to the general public health.  
 
 
Discourses on AIDS Governance 
 
The purpose of this section is to contextualise the theoretical suggestions I 
make above. I will first relate the framework to comparative analyses of 
national responses to HIV/AIDS and then elaborate further on what 
arguments have been presented for the two democratic types of AIDS 
governance. A comparative analysis of the effectiveness of governance types 
in responding to the epidemic may yield the result that authoritarian AIDS 
governance is the most effective of the three. Such a finding should not, 
however, lead us to advocate non-democratic forms of government. Defeating 
the epidemic would be a Pyrrhic victory if in doing so we lay to waste the 




AIDS Governance in Empirical Analyses 
 
There are a few contributions in the literature that more or less systematically 
compare how governments have responded to the AIDS epidemic. Given the 
definitions I use here, most of these contributions compare HIV/AIDS 
policies, but there are nevertheless some important points of overlap with our 
governance discussion.  
 
After describing the national responses in eight countries and one continent 
the central ambition with the volume edited by Misztal and Moss (1990) is to 
explain why responses took on certain characteristics, not why some forms of 
governance were more or less effective.2 This explanatory ambition is 
understandable since there was very little variation in the epidemic that could 
be attributed to different forms of AIDS governance.3 The one governance 
aspect that features in most chapters, however, is the ‘principal dilemma’ of 
balancing the human rights of infected individuals with those of uninfected 
members of the community at large. In terms of our analytical framework, the 
way this balance is struck in a democracy is one element of defining 
responses as either idealistic or authoritative. The chapter on Africa (Fortin 
1990) in this volume does not, unfortunately, elaborate on the African 
experience of dealing with this dilemma but focuses on the resource 
constraints that hampered efforts by African governments to respond to the 
epidemic.  
 
Hyden and Lanegran (1993) discuss one way in which the effectiveness of 
government responses is undermined by general governance problems. In 
contrast to the notion of a rational ‘policy government’ that is the prevailing 
model of the policy processes in established western democracies, post-
                                                 
2 The comparison was based on case-studies of the US, Brazil, France, Belgium, West 
Germany, Italy, Poland, Australia and Africa.  
3 The destructive power of the global epidemic becomes alarmingly clear when one looks 
back at epidemiological statistics from the recent past. Misztal and Moss report the 
following WHO statistics from 1989 on cases of AIDS around the world, per continent: 
Africa, 21.322 cases based on 46 country reports; Americas, 99.752 cases based on 42 
country reports; Asia, 338 cases based on 23 country reports; Europe, 19.196 cases based 
on 28 country reports; and Oceania, 1.286 cases based on 6 country reports. With only a 
total of 141.894 reported cases of AIDS in 1989, the global pandemic was still to unfold in 
the future. (Moss and Misztal 1990 p. 6).    
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independence politics in Africa is mainly characterised by the distribution of 
patronage.  
 
This form of governance has far-reaching consequences for the governments’ 
ability and willingness to act forcefully against AIDS since: ‘issues such as 
AIDS, that carry no immediate rewards for individual politicians, are difficult 
to get on the political agenda and, once there, policymakers do not give them 
the attention they deserve’ (ibid: 58). In relation to this general explanation 
for inaction by East African governments, the Ugandan response under 
President Museveni appears to be an anomaly. However, the strong action by 
the government of Uganda is not explained with less patronage politics but  
 
‘by the fact that [Museveni’s] own political supporters are among 
the worst affected … [To] the extent that the principal political 
leader take their own initiatives or responded affirmatively to 
outside pressures, there is a positive correlation between 
demonstrations of public concern, on the one hand, and how 
close to home the disease strikes, on the other’ (ibid: 59-60).  
 
More than any other African president, Uganda’s Museveni has been praised 
at the global level for the way he took leadership over his government’s 
strong response to HIV/AIDS. However, the criticism formulated by Hyden 
and Lanegran has been elaborated on in more recent accounts.    
 
The monograph edited by Zungu-Dirwayi et al. (Zungu-Dirwayi et al. 2004) 
lacks theoretical grounding but offers much relevant empirical information. 
By comparing HIV/AIDS policies across six countries in Southern Africa4, 
they show that all countries (including non-democratic Swaziland) have 
formulated wide-ranging policies that are in line with global policy 
prescriptions. However, at the level of governance, the authors point out 
differences in the degree of stake-holder participation in the policymaking 
process. Non-governmental organisations were only marginally involved in 
the policymaking in Swaziland, and no such participation informed the 
formulation of the HIV/AIDS ‘strategic plans’ in either Swaziland or South 
Africa (ibid: 35-36). It is also interesting to note that to the extent the 
countries, on the whole, subscribe to a rights-based approach to HIV/AIDS, 
                                                 
4 Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.  
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they differ greatly in the degree to which those principles have been enshrined 
in law and the courts have developed a jurisprudence around HIV/AIDS. 
(Ibid: 59-63).  
 
In his analysis of donor-driven demands for the introduction of National 
AIDS Commissions in the early 1990s, James Putzel (2004) argues that the 
effectiveness of previously state-run responses was undermined by this new 
organisational template; his analysis exemplifies the suggestion above that 
donor dependency may help explain the lack of success in fighting the 
epidemic. One reason for this was that the institutional reforms in both 
Uganda and Senegal caused considerable in-fighting between government 
departments, something that in part can be attributed to poor general 
governance. But Putzel’s analysis also discusses aspects of this demand for a 
particular institutional template that relates specifically to our discussion of 
AIDS Governance:  
 
‘There is in the template an implicit assessment of the inability of 
organizations within the state, or public authority, to implement 
HIV/AIDS programmes and an implicit, virtually ideological 
belief that NGOs, religious organizations and private sector 
organizations will be able to do better. Donor agencies promoting 
the organizational template failed to recognize that in countries 
like Uganda and Senegal, it was initiative from the state and the 
political organizations that controlled it, that mobilized and 
negotiated the involvement of religious organizations and NGOs 
in the campaign against HIV/AIDS and not the other way around. 
The model obscured important tensions and trade-offs necessary 
in the fight against AIDS and confronted by leaders in Uganda 
and Senegal: between respecting individual rights and ensuring 
the rights of all to public health; and between promoting the 
decentralization of resources and authority and ensuring effective 
deployment of resources and central direction to control a health 
emergency’ (ibid: 1138).  
 
The imposition of the organisational template that was advocated by the 
global donors seems to have caused a shift in AIDS Governance in at least 
two respects. Firstly, the state had previously dominated the formulation and 
implementation of an effective response and had invited non-state actors and 
organisations only in so far as such broadened participation further 
strengthened the response. The new organisational template reversed this 
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logic by prescribing broad NGO participation as a key to success. This had 
implications not only at central level but also in how resources and control 
were decentralised to actors and organisations across the country. Secondly, 
the trade-offs between individual and collective rights that shaped effective 
responses were renegotiated in favour of individual rights as a consequence of 
this broadened participation. This second point is elaborated on in Putzel’s 
report to DFID that was the basis for his article (Putzel 2003). In early efforts 
to contain the virus, both Uganda and Senegal enforced compulsory testing of 
military personnel and commercial sex workers. While such interventions 
were successful they run counter to many rights-based arguments for how to 
respond to HIV/AIDS.  
 
Peter Baldwin, finally, has arguably written the most thorough analysis of the 
political response to HIV/AIDS to date (Baldwin 2005). Although his cases 
are restricted to the US and Western Europe, the analysis is relevant also to 
Africa. Baldwin’s ambition is to explain why the national responses took on 
such different characteristics despite the similarity of the threat posed by 
AIDS. He criticises previous analyses, such as the comparison by Kirp and 
Bayer (Kirp and Bayer 1992), for suggesting that countries opted for a similar 
consensus-oriented response. Instead, Baldwin argues, countries came up with 
widely diverging responses to the central question: ‘how to reconcile the 
individual’s claim to autonomy and liberty with the community’s concern 
with safety?’ (ibid: 3). Countries responded, argues Baldwin, according to the 
logic of path dependency, i.e. largely depending on how they had responded 
to previous threats to public health. In analysing these differences, Baldwin 
refers to the same element of governance as previous authors:  
 
‘Almost uniformly, the two public health strategies available to 
Western health authorities were described as some variant of a 
division into a compulsive, reactionary line and a voluntary, 
progressive approach, a contain-and-control strategy and one based 
on cooperation and inclusion’ (ibid: 38).  
 
The empirical variation we see in our dependent and independent variables on 
the basis of the literature reviewed here is not conducive to generating 
explanatory arguments through comparative analyses of AIDS Governance. 
The fact that Western countries all managed to contain the epidemic despite 
the fact that they, according to Baldwin, responded with different governance 
approaches suggests that the type of governance had little to do with that 
success. To some extent a similar problem applies to Africa where most 
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countries have failed in their responses to HIV/AIDS while intervening with 
very similar sets of policies and forms of governance. However, on the basis 
of descriptive analyses of HIV/AIDS policies we can nevertheless glean some 
potentially interesting differences in this regard that warrant further analysis. 
On the basis of Putzel’s analysis we can ask to what extent did the early 
successes of Senegal and Uganda depend on the type of AIDS governance 
that framed their policy approaches at that stage, and has the imposition of 
more idealistic governance templates subsequently reduced the effectiveness 
of those responses? And on the basis of the comparison of AIDS policies in 
Southern Africa we can ask if the lower degree of stake-holder participation 
in Swaziland and South Africa resulted in the adoption of policies that civil 
society participation otherwise would have altered or stopped altogether?  
 
The one governance dimension that was referred to explicitly in most of the 
literature relates to the balancing of individual human rights of those infected 
by HIV with the rights of the majority to be protected from infection. But this 
is only one of the elements that define the difference between democratic 
types of AIDS Governance. In order to contextualise the other elements we 
now turn to reviewing some of the more dominant normative contributions in 
the literature. They will provide us with further dimensions of AIDS 
governance that we can include in our analytical framework.  
 
 
Idealistic AIDS governance 
 
The genealogy of idealistic AIDS Governance can arguably be traced back to 
two distinct discourses—one on human rights and one on the link between 
democracy and development.  
 
On the basis of the discrimination experienced by people first infected by HIV 
in the early 1980s, a number of prominent activists and global health 
advocates formulated a ‘human rights approach’ to HIV/AIDS. The basic 
argument was, according to Mark Heywood (2000), that HIV was different 
from previous public health threats such as cholera, smallpox and tuberculosis 
in that it is not communicated through casual contact, nor is it easily 
identifiable. Therefore, rather than enforcing harsh measures, ‘[its] control 
depends upon creating a climate of trust and on breaking the stigmas that 
silence most people it infects’ (ibid: 13-14). Unless such trust can be created 
between people infected with HIV on the one hand and the authorities and the 
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general community on the other, ‘stigma and unfair discrimination against 
people with HIV […] drives the epidemic underground and increases the risk 
to other people of the very thing they fear—HIV infection’ (ibid: 13). The 
logic to this argument presents us with the ‘AIDS paradox’. Whereas previous 
public health threats were contained successfully by protecting the uninfected 
majority from the infected minority, AIDS is best responded to, according to 
this argument, by protecting the infected minority from the discrimination of 
the uninfected majority.  
 
There is considerable overlap in time and geographical space between the 
global pandemic and the wave of democratisation that swept across Africa, 
Eastern Europe and parts of Asia in the 1990s. The most tangible change in 
this political process was of course the many regime transitions in which 
authoritarian governments were replaced by democratically elected ones. 
Democracy, we learnt, does not require a process of modernisation over 
generations as previously had been argued, but can be based in negotiated 
elite pacts over a certain constellation of political institutions that run parallel 
to the market economy. This is, essentially, the liberal democratic ideal—its 
ideologues would soon pronounce on the end of history.  
 
This change in the discourse from a structural to an institutional argument 
about the preconditions for democracy was soon also reflected in dominant 
texts on development. The key text that marks this change is the 2002 UNDP 
Human Development Report that placed the notion of ‘democratic 
governance’ at the centre of global development efforts (UNDP 2002). In that 
report, UNDP infused a strong dose of liberal democratic principles and 
institutions into a development discourse that previously had been more 
interested in social structures and substantial political outcomes; democratic 
governance had inherent values, politics was not just a means to an end.  
 
A central contribution to the literature on governance and HIV/AIDS appears 
to have taken its cue from this UNDP approach. In a joint UNDP and 
UNAIDS publication, Lee-Nah Hsu presents an argument for democratic 
governance in relation to HIV/AIDS (Hsu 2004).5 A democratic governance 
response to HIV/AIDS should be based upon three pillars, argues Hsu (ibid: 
3-4). The first pillar represents participation by and responsiveness towards 
                                                 
5 Since I have commented on Hsu’s argument and research at some length elsewhere 
(Strand et al. 2005) I shall only briefly summarise the argument here. 
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all stakeholders in a political process that seeks to build consensus. The 
second pillar is to ensure that human rights are protected by the rule of law, 
and that power is transparent and can be held accountable. Thirdly, the policy 
outcome of such governance should seek to maximise the ideals of equality, 
equity and efficiency. The first two of these three ‘pillars’ relate to the 
governance concept as defined in this paper: the response to HIV/AIDS 
should be decided on through a participatory and inclusive process that is 
constrained by requirements to ensure that human rights are respected, that 
the process and the implementation of its results are transparent, and that 
politicians can be held accountable for their decisions in this regard.  
 
A similar argument for idealistic AIDS governance is made by Maite Irurzun-
Lopez and Nana Poku (2005). In order to overcome the problems that African 
states have experienced in fighting HIV/AIDS effectively, African states 
should pursue AIDS governance. In contrast to my use of the concept of AIDS 
governance above, Irurzun-Lopez and Poku do not frame it as a variable but 
ascribe to it a certain quality and content in terms of process and outcome:  
 
‘The principles of AIDS governance are a commitment to pursue 
long-term AIDS policies, incorporation of a gender approach into 
AIDS policies, inclusion of a participatory and accountable decision-
making processes, promotion of equity in health care, and the 
development of a human rights-based rationale for treatment’ (ibid: 
219).  
 
The problem with the idealistic argument, as was mentioned above, is not the 
norms that it favours, but rather that those who are making the argument fail 
to show that these norms are effective in dealing with the epidemic. This is, to 
my mind, particularly problematic in relation to the more generally 
democratic ideals other than human rights—the logic and arguments 
underpinning the ‘AIDS paradox’ seem convincing to me. What evidence is 
there for the argument that a response will be more effective in fighting 
HIV/AIDS if it encourages broad participation, if it allows people to hold 
politicians accountable, if it is responsive to public opinion, and if it realises 





Authoritative AIDS governance 
 
The arguments for this type of AIDS Governance in Africa in the 21st century 
are mostly presented in the literature as brief comments in critique of the 
apparent governance failures to date, and often with reference to one or more 
countries where similar interventions have been successful, such as Cuba and 
Thailand. The case for this type of AIDS Governance has not, to the best of 
my knowledge, been elaborated at length like arguments for idealistic AIDS 
Governance.  
 
We need to remind ourselves that this type of governance is still democratic 
in that it has been adopted through a democratic process and is bound by the 
Rule of Law—it is not an authoritarian response to HIV/AIDS. This point is 
central to the argument that we can have (at least) two different types of 
democratic responses to HIV/AIDS, the idealistic and the authoritative. 
Whereas the former gains its legitimacy mainly through its democratic 
content, the legitimacy of the latter response relies on the process through 
which it was adopted. This point is made succinctly by James Putzel:  
 
‘Even if more coercive measures of testing and control may be 
judged necessary to fighting the epidemic, the legitimacy of such 
measures would be much more readily established if they were 
arrived at through democratic processes of decision making, The 
character of the HIV/AIDS epidemic is such that both individual 
sexual behaviour change and the transformation of social norms of 
sexual behaviour lie at the core of prevention and it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to secure these through coercion. It is this that 
makes the case for democracy compelling’ (Putzel 2003: 40).  
 
One such coercive measure that would be based on a restriction in the 
individual’s rights would be to enforce compulsory HIV testing. The 
argument that an effective response to the epidemic in Africa requires that all 
people know their seropositive status and then change their behaviour 
accordingly is made by Kevin De Cock and his colleagues in an often cited 
paper (De Cock, Marum, and Mbori-Ngacha 2002). The authors are not 
insensitive to the potentially problematic implications of such a shift towards 
authoritative AIDS Governance. They argue, however, that the strategic use 
of new testing technologies as well as a commitment to providing care for 
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those who are found to be HIV positive would address such concerns to some 
extent:  
 
‘Focusing on positive aspects of rights, rather than negative 
consequences of public health action, and strengthening efforts to 
prevent discrimination, offer synergy between science-based HIV 
prevention and increased access to care. […] HIV testing should be 
sanctioned by law, aimed at a legitimate public health goal, 
necessary to achieve that goal, no more intrusive or restrictive than 
necessary, and non-discriminatory in character’ (ibid: 1847).  
 
The same call for universal testing as one of several possible authoritative 
measures is made by Tim Allen (2004). One of the determinants of the 
effectiveness of future HIV/AIDS policies in Africa, argues Allen, is ‘the 
degree that concerns about human rights are set aside’, and he continues:  
 
‘It is certainly true that there are many things that are not known 
about HIV/AIDS, but it is in fact known how to control it, and not 
just in rich countries. Enforced testing, enforced use of condoms, 
segregation of those who are positive, and perhaps enforced 
compliance with antiretroviral regimes: these are strategies which 
would have an effect. They also involve what might be regarded as 
infringements of civil liberties, and it seems likely that they could 
only be implemented in parts of the world by military force. […] 
Elsewhere, the human rights of those who are HIV positive are 
privileged over those who are not. It is very understandable why 
this is the case, but in public health terms it is potentially 
counterproductive’ (ibid: 1127).  
 
The arguments by De Cock and Allen both centre on the need to restrict 
individual human rights in order to make responses to the epidemic more 
effective—this is by far the most common argument in favour of authoritative 
AIDS Governance. While this argument runs counter to the rights-based 
approach to HIV/AIDS that is inherent to idealistic AIDS Governance, it does 
not imply a principled disregard for human rights but rather relies on a more 
general interpretation of human rights as these are entrenched in international 
instruments and ratified by national governments. In terms of authoritative 
AIDS Governance, in other words, it is not a matter of whether or not to 
respect human rights, but a question of how rights should be interpreted in the 
context of the HIV/AIDS health emergency and how different rights should 
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be prioritised internally. This central point is elaborated on in an important 
paper by Jenny Kuper (2004):  
 
‘The theme of seemingly conflicting rights is repeated throughout 
the discourse linking HIV/AIDS and human rights law, and is 
indeed an inherent feature of law itself, in the sense that almost all 
rules have exceptions, and most obligations have limitations, and 
rights of one group of people often have to be balanced against 
rights of others […] International human rights law explicitly 
allows for exceptions, e.g. on the grounds of public health […]’ 
(ibid: 22).  
 
However, continues Kuper, in order for restrictions of rights to be legitimate, 
such exceptions must meet the following criteria, as defined in international 
human rights conventions:  
 
• The particular action has to be in accordance with national 
law;  
• It has to be in the interest of a legitimate objective;  
• It has to be strictly necessary to achieve this goal;  
• It must be the least restrictive alternative, and;  
• It must not be imposed in an unreasonable or discriminatory 
way (ibid: 22-23).  
 
It would seem that the analysis by Kuper has identified the precise point at the 
centre of debates between advocates for idealistic and authoritative AIDS 
Governance, so far as the types refer to human rights. Whereas the former 
theoretical type of governance will deny the need for any such restrictions in 
line with the logic of the ‘AIDS paradox’, the latter will argue they are 
necessary for an effective response. A democratic and constitutional process 
of making and policing such restrictions will ensure that this element of 
authoritative AIDS Governance never transforms into the un-democratic 
authoritarian type.  
 
Just like the notion of idealistic AIDS governance builds on more elements 
than human rights, so does the authoritative type. In other words, a response 
to HIV/AIDS by a national government can arguably also restrict the ideals of 
participation and accountability (and perhaps even transparency) on the basis 
of the argument that by doing so the response will have a greater chance of 
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reversing the epidemic. I shall introduce this discussion with a paragraph by 
Alex de Waal that spells out what ‘democratic governance’ would need to 
mean in Africa in order to generate an effective response:  
 
‘Identifying the dilemmas and options, taking the decisions, policy 
triage and implementing the policies consistently and effectively 
over a sustained period requires a robust democratic consensus. In 
fact, a new social contract is required for the era of AIDS. This in 
turn requires informed public discussion and democratic decision-
making. Without this, policies will be imposed and will be seen as 
such, and will therefore not be properly implemented, and will be 
liable to reversal when the political climate changes. However, 
given the extraordinary constraints on the functioning of national 
institutions, we may have to reinvent democracy itself for the age 
of AIDS’ (De Waal 2004 p. 45).  
 
It is of course not only national institutions that are found wanting in Africa’s 
democracies. Most African countries that are severely affected by the 
epidemic lack a robust democratic consensus as well as the public discussion 
and democratic decision-making procedures by which to formulate and 
entrench such a consensus. What, then, would it imply to ‘reinvent democracy 
for the age of AIDS’? Let me conclude by briefly outlining two arguments in 
relation to the ideals of participation and accountability respectively.6  
 
The argument that broad participation from civil society will generate an 
effective response against HIV/AIDS makes two critical assumptions. The 
first of these is that those who participate are sufficiently aware and mobilised 
to support the necessary policy interventions, also when these interventions 
may run counter to predominant cultural and/or religious beliefs as well as 
public opinion on how state resources should be prioritised. While such 
support should not be uncritical of what the government suggests, NGOs and 
various traditional and community leaders must be open to being convinced 
about the need for unpopular interventions. If such a consensus on the need 
for strong interventions cannot be established, and where community leaders 
                                                 
6 By using this paragraph by Alex de Waal to introduce a discussion of the political 
elements of authoritative AIDS Governance I do not mean to imply that this was what he 
had in mind in formulating that paragraph or that he necessarily would agree with the gist 
of what I propose. 
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represent sizeable political constituencies on which the government relies for 
electoral support, such broad participation is more likely to generate 
ineffective responses. The research that has been done on the Afrobarometer 
public surveys shows that HIV/AIDS is low on the ‘public agenda’, also in 
countries that are most severely affected by AIDS (Mattes 2004; Whiteside et 
al. 2004). This finding alone suggests that an assumption that a higher degree 
of public participation will generate a more effective response is mistaken and 
needs to be contextualised or, perhaps, discarded altogether.  
 
Secondly, public participation in political processes is costly. While 
democratic policy processes need to invite commentary from particular 
stakeholders and also be open to the general public, every additional such 
form and instance of participation implies a cost in terms of time, money and 
other resources—none of which are in abundance in the African countries that 
are worst hit by the epidemic. The opportunity for participation may need to 
be circumscribed on this ground as well. 
 
The ideal of political accountability in the response to HIV/AIDS is also 
based on a problematic assumption that the elected political leader needs the 
threat of electoral sanctioning in order to make and to keep to a commitment 
to prioritising resources on the fight against HIV/AIDS. However, as the 
results from the Afrobarometer show us, there are no indications of such a 
prioritization of HIV/AIDS among the electorates in Southern Africa. It is 
arguably more likely that the awareness about what early interventions are 
necessary in order to contain an as yet invincible HIV/AIDS epidemic is 
limited to political and societal elites. Unless such elites make common cause 
in creating an awareness of the epidemic and an understanding of what 
potentially intrusive, costly and morally contentious interventions will 
become necessary, the argument for accountability is more likely to silence 
politicians on the question of HIV/AIDS. This point is borne out by Nelson 
Mandela in a reflection on his term as leader of the African National Congress 
and President of South Africa. When asked about the reasons for his relative 
silence on HIV/AIDS in the run-up to the 1994 elections, Mandela confessed 
to not using the electoral platform to build public awareness about the 
epidemic and the necessary interventions because he had been told by ANC 
campaign strategists that such messages were unpopular among the ANC 
constituency: ‘I wanted to win’, said Mandela, ‘and I stopped talking about 
AIDS’ (BBC 2003). While it is mistaken to assume that accountability will 
generate a strong response in the early stages of an epidemic, such an 
assumption may be more relevant as the epidemic matures and the visible 
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effects of AIDS related illnesses and mortality has started to generate a 
demand for a general roll-out of antiretroviral treatment.  
 
Political accountability and participation can also be restricted by democratic 
politicians delegating the power to determine policy to a corps of bureaucratic 
medical experts. The extent to which this happened differed across the 
countries analysed by Peter Baldwin:  
 
‘Those who called for drastic precautions confronted the defence 
of civil rights by recently mobilized sexual and ethnic minorities. 
No wonder experts and policy makers sought to shift the issue 
from the glare and heat of public dispute to the more temperate 
clime of bureaucracy. ... [Most] legal instruments dealing with 
AIDS were not laws, debated in Parliament or Congress and open 
to political grandstanding, but decrees, ministerial orders, and 
circulars, issued by officials without consultation or input from 
elected representatives.’ (Baldwin 2005: 208-209).  
 
The authoritative type of AIDS Governance would thus not only consider 
restricting the application of a rights-based approach but also the level and 
form of participation and accountability to ensure a more effective response. 
Let me now conclude by restating some key points and elaborating somewhat 
on the framework I proposed above.  
 
 
Conclusions: Comparing AIDS Governance 
 
My discussion started off with a critique of the normative conception of the 
type of governance that would be most likely to yield an effective response to 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa. My critique of a ‘democratic governance’ 
response to HIV/AIDS is based both on the lack of evidence for the 
effectiveness of such a response in terms of containing and reversing the 
epidemic, and also on how that argument appears to disregard the 
‘governance dilemmas’ that it generates. The political incentives that the 
ideals of participation and accountability present to democratically elected 
politicians may in fact rather generate a set of interventions that are 
ineffective in the fight against the epidemic. We would be mistaken to assume 
the opposite. We need, clearly, to better understand how AIDS governance 
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interacts with democratic politics in Africa. Others, like James Putzel, have 
made this point before:  
 
‘There is a tension between the principles of democracy and the 
respect for individual rights on the one hand and the imperatives of 
securing public health on the other. While it is fashionable at the 
beginning of the 21st century to see all things ‘democratic’ as 
unquestionably ‘good’, the experience of fighting HIV/AIDS 
epidemic […] calls for a more nuanced understanding of the role 
of democratic organisations and institutions’ (Putzel 2003: 39).  
 
My main ambition with suggesting a comparative research agenda on AIDS 
Governance has been to contribute to the development of such a nuanced 
understanding of what forms democratic governance can take in fighting the 
epidemic. By making a distinction between idealistic and authoritative types 
of democratic AIDS Governance we transform the notion of ‘democratic 
AIDS governance’ from a postulated ideal into a variable that will allow us to 
design comparative analyses of AIDS governance by democratic 
governments. Together with the non-democratic authoritarian type of AIDS 
governance we have identified three potential categories of AIDS governance 
that may capture the empirical variation in our independent variable. In table 
3 below I propose how these types can be operationalised in relation to three 
defining elements of AIDS governance.  
 
While I would argue that these three governance dimensions are most 
important, one could possibly add ‘responsiveness’ and ‘transparency’ in 
order to capture further nuances in the differences between the three types of 
AIDS governance.  
 
The framework will allow for systematic descriptions of the variation in the 
independent variable ‘AIDS governance’. We should not necessarily expect a 
particular country (or ‘case’) to closely approximate one type of governance 
on all three governance elements—there will be many empirical nuances in 
the type of AIDS governance in Africa that we should try to explain, much 
like Baldwin and others have attempted to do in America and Europe. 
However, much work remains before we can establish a causal link between 
AIDS governance and the effectiveness of the response, which is the ultimate 
aim of this research agenda; it is far from clear how one should define and 
operationalise ‘effectiveness’. It is nevertheless a theoretical and 
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methodological challenge we need to meet successfully in order for political 
science to make a substantial contribution to the fight against HIV/AIDS.   
 
 
Table 3: Operationalisation of types of AIDS Governance 
 
OPERATIONALISATION AIDS 
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policy is kept in 
the political 
arena and is 
open to electoral 
accountability  
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controlled by the 
state. Selected 
stake-holders may 
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